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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have great practi-
cal importance for surveillance systems to perform monitoring by
acquiring and sending information on any intrusion in a secured
area. Requirement of very little human intervention is one of the
most desirable features of WSNs, thus making it a cheaper and
safer alternative for securing large areas such as international
borders. Jamming attacks in WSNs can be applied to disrupt
communications among the sensor nodes in the network. Since
it is difficult to prevent jamming attacks, detection and mapping
out the jammed regions is critical to overcome this problem. In
a security monitoring scenario, the network operators will be
able to take proper measures against jamming once the jammed
regions in the network are known to them. It is also desirable to
keep the interactions of the sensor nodes in the network minimal,
as they are low powered devices and need to conserve their
resources. In this paper we propose a light-weight technique for
faster mapping of the jammed regions. We minimize the load
on the sensors by removing the actual responsibility of mapping
from the network to the central base station (BS). After a few
nodes report to the BS, it carries out the task of mapping of the
jammed regions in the network. We use our simulation results to
compare our proposed system with the existing techniques and
also to measure the performance of our system. Our results show
that the jammed regions in a network can be mapped from fewer
nodes reporting to the base station.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) typically consists of
a large number of autonomous devices with limited battery
power and memory. Since cheap commodity devices can
be used as sensor nodes, it is possible to do large scale
deployment of sensor networks [1], [5]. They are ideal for
monitoring to detect intruders physically entering a secured or
otherwise important region [8]. Thus, sensor networks have a
wide variety of applications in security monitoring, such as
protecting water supplies, chemical plants and nuclear power
plants and in border security and battle field surveillance.
Typically, WSNs are left unattended for efficient, low-cost
monitoring. Thus, they are deployed without any physical
protection. Also, the nodes in a WSN communicate with each
other through a shared wireless medium. These two features
make WSNs particularly vulnerable to a variety of attacks [6],
[18], [10]. Jamming [16], [12] is a particularly effective attack
against WSNs. An intruder can easily place jamming devices
in different parts of the network to cause radio interference
and thus disrupt communications among the sensor nodes that
are in close proximity to the jamming devices. Fig. 1 shows a
border security deployment scenario in which the red sensors
have been jammed by the jamming sensors present in the
network.
Fig. 1: Wireless sensor network for border monitoring
A jamming attack effectively creates a denial of service
condition in the network. This a major problem in security
monitoring applications, in which the lack of sensor commu-
nication means that an intruder can physically enter jammed
regions without the threat of being detected. For example,
in a border security setting, a path may be constructed with
jamming devices that allows the intruder to cross back and
forth across the border, completely bypassing the security
perimeter. In this case, denial of service in the network leads
to a major breach of physical security. It is critical in these
monitoring applications for the base station to learn about and
map out the jammed regions quickly and accurately so as to
know where physical security may be threatened and where
it may be necessary to increase other security measures like
guard patrols or surveillance flights.
Wood et al. propose JAM [19], a jammed area mapping
technique, that relies on the ability of the nodes to perform a
detailed mapping of the jammed region locally. JAM is very
effective at mapping out the jammed region. However, it is
also a very complex protocol with high message and storage
overheads at the nodes, due to its fully decentralized nature.
It requires a lot of interaction among the nodes surrounding
the jammed regions to estimate the region and correctly put
the jammed nodes into groups. In settings such as the border
security scenario shown in Fig. 1, it is vital to protect the
sensor network and to detect the intruder as early as possible
2while keeping communication overhead low to save sensors’
battery lifetime.
Contributions. In this paper, we present a model for studying
the jammed sensor mapping problem (§III). We are the first to
point out that mapping jammed nodes should be done quickly
and efficiently, not just accurately. This observation suggests a
different set of design choices than those made in JAM (briefly
described in §II).
In particular, instead of mapping being performed locally
by the sensor nodes, we leverage the powerful base station
to gather information from the network and calculate where
the jammed regions are. In this protocol (§IV), rather than
an exact mapping, we only aim to get an approximation of
the jammed area computed by the central base station. We
apply k-means clustering to accurately separate out multiple
jammed regions. We then invoke a method based on convex-
hull finding algorithms to find the centers for these regions
and then apply iterative adjustment to accurately locate and
determine the size of the region. This approach relieves the
sensors surrouding a jammed area from the communication
overhead and power consumption of calculating the jammed
regions.
We developed a simulator (§V) to evaluate our system
and compare it with JAM in terms of effective mapping and
communication overhead. Our results demonstrate that the
proposed protocol performs faster mapping, thereby saving
substantial message overhead compared with JAM, and it
provides reasonable mapping accuracy. We also experiment
with the trade-off between the communication overhead of
the sensor nodes and the mapping performance of the system.
Finally we run experiments on real sensor notes to see the
performance of our jammed region mapping technique (§VI).
II. RELATED WORK
Communication in the WSN in the presence of jamming has
been investigated previously. Wormhole-based anti-jamming
techniques and timing channels are discussed in [2], [4],
[21].Various spread-spectrum communication techniques are
used to defend jamming in the wireless networks [12], [20],
[22]. Since, large scale deployment of WSNs mostly have
cheap commodity devices as sensor nodes, it is unlikely that
they will possess the design complexity to perform spread
spectrum techniques, and are more likely to use a single
frequency. Some works involve detection of radio interfer-
ence [23] in WSNs. The packet delivery ratio (PDR) and
the measurement of signal strength can be used to detect
jamming in WSNs [16]. Jamming detection by monitoring
channel utilization is discussed in JAM [19], where the sensors
decide they are jammed when their channel utility is below a
certain threshold.
JAM [19] is a complete protocol for the jammed area
mapping after detection. In this protocol a node that discovers
that it has been jammed broadcasts jammed messages to
its neighbors informing them that it has been jammed. The
neighboring nodes that are farther in the distance from the
jamming effect but located near the boundary of the jammed
region will be able to receive these messages and initiate the
JAM protocol. By this protocol, the boundary nodes map out
the jammed area by exchanging messages among themselves
regarding the jammed nodes.
In our protocol, the central BS performs the jammed region
mapping.
III. MODEL
In this section we present the basic characteristics of the
network and intruder models that we are going to use for our
protocol.
A. Network model
We study our system in a homogeneous network model
in which all the nodes are stationary, location aware, and
also have roughly the same sensing capabilities. These sensor
nodes possess limited power and utilize wireless channels to
communicate with other nodes within their signal range.
The sensor nodes close to a jamming device are unable to
receive any messages from their neighbors since the channel
is jammed and therefore unable to communicate with any of
their neighbors. However, the nodes that are on the edge of a
jammed region are able to send messages to their un-jammed
neighbors outside the jamming range and send notification
messages to them once they detect jamming among some of
their neighboring nodes. These nodes are called the boundary
nodes.
The base station (BS) is a distinguished component with
much more computational power and communication re-
sources than the sensor nodes in the network. The BS is also
aware of the network topology and the location of the sensor
nodes in the network [14], [7].
During the deployment phase, flooding messages are sent by
the BS to construct a spanning tree rooted at the BS; applying
breadth first search. All the nodes within the range of the BS
set the BS as their parent and rebroadcast this message to their
neighboring nodes. In this way, each node has information
about it’s predecessor nodes and the minimum distance to the
BS, which is used for routing by applying the standard routing
algorithms and common pratices [17], [15].
An example network is shown in Fig. 2a.
B. Intruder model
In a traditional wireless communication system, a jammer
launches jamming attacks on the physical and data link layers
of the WSNs with the goal of preventing reception of commu-
nications at the receiver end using as little power as possible.
In this paper, we consider an intruder who can deploy jam-
ming devices that act as constant jammers. The intruder can
place these malicious nodes or jamming devices at arbitrary
locations in the network for the purpose of creating a DOS
condition or an unmonitored path through the network.
We assume that the jamming devices have similar hardware
capabilities as the sensor nodes in the network, and that they
act as constant jammers. Thus they disrupt any communication
in the surrounding area by emitting continuous radio signals.
3They can be implemented using regular wireless devices that
continuously sending out random bits to the channel without
following any MAC-layer protocol [16] and thus effectively
being able to block the legitimate traffic sources from using
the channel. The range of these jamming devices may vary,
and their range is not known to the sensor nodes or the BS.
For example, in Fig. 2b, we present a scenario in which there
are five jamming sensors in the network. The red nodes are the
sensor nodes that are jammed and are unable to communicate
with the unjammed nodes marked in green.
IV. MAPPING PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a detailed description of our
protocol for mapping the jammed regions in a WSN. We used
the sequence in Fig. 2 as an example to guide our discussion.
The mapping is performed in few steps as described in
following sections.
1) In the first step, the boundary nodes on the edge of a
jammed region detects jamming in the network (§ IV-A),
then some of them send notifications to the nodes outside
the jamming range.
2) Some of the nodes that got notifications, report to the
BS about the presence of jamming in the network.
3) The BS then locates the jammed regions and finally
maps those regions based on the information it has
received.
A. Jamming detection and notification to the BS
A jamming device present in the network jams all the benign
nodes within its signal range. We assume that the nodes are
able to detect jamming of neighboring nodes. After detecting
jamming some of these nodes send reports to the BS. We call
the nodes that report jamming to the BS as reporter nodes. To
keep the overall message overhead to a minimum, not all the
nodes that detect jamming become reporter nodes. Whether a
node will send a report to the BS depends on the following
two decisions.
• Decision to become reporter: When a node detects jam-
ming among its neighbors, it decides with some probability
Prep, whether or not to become a reporter node. Prep should
be determined according to the density of the network
and also depending on the required accuracy of mapping.
Once jamming starts and an unjammed node finds jamming
among its neighbor nodes, it starts making a list of these
jammed nodes. In Fig. 2c, the green nodes are the reporter
nodes of the network with Prep = 0.5, and the red ones are
the jammed nodes that are reported to the BS.
• Decision to notify neighbors: The farther a reporter
node is located from the BS, the greater the number of
messages required for sending jamming notifications to the
BS. To reduce this overhead while ensuring good reporting
coverage, we use a simple scheme where the reporter node
multiplies its distance to the BS with the number of its
neighbors and Prep. If this value is greater than a threshold
value Trep, the node will send an alert to its neighbors. If
a node is the first one to notify its neighbors, it will send
(a) WSN (b) Jamming in WSN
(c) Reporter nodes (d) Finding jammed regions
(e) Convex hull of the regions (f) Mapped area
Fig. 2: Mapping sequence.
a report to the BS, otherwise it does not. If this value is
less than or equal to Trep, the node will send the report
to the BS without sending any alerts to its neighbors. For
example, a reporter node i will alert its neighbors if Eq. 1
is fulfilled.
Disti ×Neighbori × Prep ≤ Trep (1)
Here, Neighbori is the number of neighbors of the reporter
node and Disti is its distance from the BS. A node that gets
an alert from a neighboring reporter node will not send any
notification messages to the BS, even if it has selected itself
as a reporter node. The equation has been designed so that
if the node is too far from the base station and has many
neighbors the probablilty of it sending a message to the base
station. The value Trep is determined based on the average
distance to the BS and average number of neighbors for the
sensor nodes in the network. There is a trade off between
the cost of sending a notification from a reporter node to the
BS and of sending notifications to the reporter’s neighbors.
4Trep should be chosen such that it reduces the message
overhead.
B. Locating the jammed regions of the network
Once the BS starts receiving notifications of jamming from
the un-jammed nodes located at the various parts of the
network, it starts building its own list of known jammed
nodes in the network. Since the BS may get notifications
of jamming from different parts of the network, it applies
a clustering algorithm to decide on the number and location
of the jammed regions in the network. For this purpose, we
used k-means [11], [13], which is a partition-based clustering
algorithm. The geographical positions of the nodes are used
as data points and the euclidean distance between nodes is
used as the distance measure. The output of the algorithm are
clusters, which represent the jammed regions in the network.
k is one of the inputs to the k-means clustering and in
this case it stands for the number of jammed regions in the
network. This value is not known apriori to the BS. If there is
no manual assistance available to determine the probable value
of k, the BS needs to decide on the best value of k, based on
the information it receives from the nodes in the network.
Since, the quality of the clustering by k-means greatly
depends on the selection of initial centroids, the BS runs the
algorithm on a maximum value of k for a certain number of
times, each time using k random points as initial centroids.
So, the BS starts from k = kmax and picks k random nodes
among its list of jammed nodes to serve as k initial centroids.
The BS then runs the k-means algorithm a fixed number of
times for this value of k. In each round, the BS picks the
best result with the lowest sum of squared error (SSE). For
the next round, it merges two of the closest clusters from the
previous best result and generates a new centroid from the
mean of the centroids for these two clusters. The BS then
uses this new centroid and the other k− 2 centroids as initial
centroids for the next round of k-means for k − 1 clusters.
Except for the first round with the maximum value of k, BS
runs the k-means algorithm only once for each decrement of
k, until k = 1.
After generating kmax number of clusters by the process
described above, the BS decides on the optimal value of k
from the results. To do this, BS compares the improvements
in the SSE value for each of the clustering results from k =
2 to kmax as improvement Impk –
Impk = (SSEk−1 − SSEk)/SSEk−1 (2)
If Impk is negative for a given value of k, clustering results
for that k are discarded. This is because of the intuition that
with the increase of k, SSE should always decrease.
From the remaining clustering results, starting from the
lowest value of k, the BS checks the nodes belonging to
the cluster corresponding for that value of k and accepts
the clustering result if all the nodes are within two standard
deviations from the mean of the cluster. If any of the nodes
is more than two standard deviations away from the mean,
the cluster is discarded. Otherwise, this k is decided to be the
number of jammed regions in the network.
When the value of k that is decided by BS is less than
or greater than the original number of jammed regions in the
network, one of the following two situations occurs -
• k < number of jammed regions: If k is less than the
number of jammed regions in the network, multiple
regions can be grouped into a single region. This causes,
more un-jammed nodes to be inside a mapped region,
thereby generating a larger FP rate.
• k > number of jammed regions: If k is greater than the
number of jammed regions in the network, a single region
can be divided in to two or more regions. This will create
multiple small regions in place of a single larger one, thus
leaving some jammed nodes outside the mapped areas
and causing a larger FN rate.
C. Jammed region mapping
After the BS first decides on the number and location of the
jammed regions present in the network, it maps the estimated
jammed area for each region. By mapping the regions, the BS
works as a classifier for a two-class prediction problem, where
the outcomes are labeled as positive (p) or negative (n) class.
The jammed nodes are labeled as positive and the un-jammed
nodes are labeled as negative. If a node inside a mapped
region is actually jammed then it is labeled as true positive
(TP); however if the node inside the mapped region is un-
jammed, then the outcome is a false positive (FP). Conversely,
a true negative (TN) can occur when an un-jammed node falls
outside the mapped regions and false negative (FN) happens
when a jammed node falls outside the mapped regions. Also,
the known positive (TP/FP) nodes to the BS are the jammed
nodes that were reported to BS by the reporter nodes and the
known negative (TN/FN) nodes to the BS are these reporter
nodes.
The mapping is performed based on the fact that jamming
devices (using an omni directional antenna) usually create have
circular shaped jamming regions in the network. The output
of the mapping protocol is shown in Fig. 2f which shows the
original network with the mapping by the BS.
To map the region for each of the jammed areas found by
BS, it first determines the center for that particular region, then
fits the jammed nodes in a circular region and finally moves
and increase the size of this region to increase the number
of known TP and while keeping the number of known FP to
minimum.
The steps are as follows-
• Determining the center for the region: The BS first
determines the center (Cj) for a region.
If the number of nodes in a cluster is less than 3, the center
is the mean of the points in the cluster.
Otherwise, the BS finds the convex hull of the cluster and
the mean of the vertices of this hull is used as the center
for that region.
The reason for finding the convex hull is to minimize
the effect of the center (Cj) being biased to the side of
5(a) Initial mapping (b) Final mapping
Fig. 3: Jammed region mapping by the BS.
the region with higher density. We use the Graham scan
algorithm to find the convex hull.
• Mapping the region: After finding the centroid (Cj) of
the jammed nodes belonging to a region, the BS takes
the largest distance between any two jammed nodes of
this region as the diameter of a circle centered at Cj
and finds the number of known jammed nodes (TP) and
reporter nodes (known FP) that are inside this circle. It also
calculates the center (Ci) of the known FP nodes (Fig. 3).
• Improvement in Mapping: To improve the mapping, the
BS moves Cj one step (away from Ci) at a time, alternating
between moves along the vertical and horizontal axes. It
continues to move the circle until either any known jammed
node goes out of the circular region or if the number of
known FP increases. If new TP nodes are added to the
region, the BS increases the diameter of the circle by a
factor to consume more jammed nodes. Fig. 3 shows the
final area mapped by the BS with the new centroid for the
jammed nodes located at (C′j).
Fig. 3 shows the region mapped by the BS based on
the information collected on the jammed nodes from the
reporter nodes. Here, the orange nodes are true positives
(TP), the green nodes are false positives (FP) and the red
nodes are false negatives (FN) among the nodes found as
jammed by the BS.
In case of jamming regions that are asymmetric or non-circular
shaped, the BS can use the result of the previously calculated
convex hull to map the region.
V. SIMULATION
We built a simple simulator to evaluate our proposed system.
We use the results to evaluate the performance of our system
and to compare our proposed system with JAM [19]. Our
comparison is based on two metrics: 1) the time to perform
the mapping of all the jammed regions present in the network,
and 2) the amount of messages exchanged among the sensor
nodes to do the mapping.
Also, to evaluate the performance of our system, we mea-
sure the performance of the mapping done by the BS in terms
of true positives, false positives, and false negatives (incre-
menting the node selection probability leads to minimizing
the number of false negatives and false positives).
In the following sections we describe the experimental
setup, methods for comparison with JAM, and then the per-
formance of the system.
A. Experimental setup
We built the simulator in C++ to simulate a border region
with dimensions of 200×200 units. In this simulator, we study
a WSN which is composed of between 500 and 1000 nodes.
These nodes are randomly deployed in this area with one node
near the upper horizontal border of the network serving as the
BS (Fig. 3a) whom all the other nodes report. During the
deployment phase of the network, for each node, the neighbor
discovery and path setup to the BS is performed. The nodes
have a fixed signal radius (10 – 20 units) and have 7 – 17
neighbors on average.
During our simulation of events, an intruder places jamming
devices randomly in the network. These devices have higher
signal radii (17 – 27 units) than the sensor nodes, and this
range can be different for the individual jamming devices in
the network. When any of the nodes in the network is jammed,
the neighboring nodes are notified by the detection process.
When a working node discovers jamming among its neighbors,
it decides to become a reporter node with probability Prep.
1) Comparison with JAM: We compare the performance of
JAM [19] and our proposed system. To do this we simulated
both JAM and our system in the exact same network condi-
tions.
Time to Map: We measured the time to map all the jammed
regions in the network by the BS.
For JAM, the time to get the mapping is measured by
the number of coalitions of jammed groups that occur at a
mapping node. This number determines the number of rounds
of build messages that are going to be sent by the mapping
nodes before the final mapping result is being sent to BS. By
this protocol, after the mapping is done, there should be ideally
one dominant group of mapped (jammed) members and only
one mapping node sends this information to BS.
For our system, total time to map is calculated by
the number of alert messages a reporter node sends to
its neighbors, which determines the time it takes for BS
to receive all the notifications of jammed nodes in the network.
Message overhead: The final goal is to have the BS learn
about all the jammed regions in the network. To acheive
this, during simulation, after mapping is done according to
JAM, exactly one node (ideally the creator of the dominant
group) from each jammed region sends a message to the BS
containing information on the related mapped nodes. In our
protocol, the overhead is the sum of the number of messages
required to be sent by all the reporter nodes to notify the BS.
For the first set of experiments, we consider networks of
three different densities – 600, 800, and 1000 nodes. For
each of these settings, the simulation results are calculated
by running JAM and our system with Prep = 0.2, 04, and0.6.
For each of these cases the simulation has been run 100 times
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Fig. 4: Comparison with JAM on time to map jammed regions.
(a)
Fig. 5: Comparison with JAM on message overhead.
and results are calculated by the arithmetic mean of these
simulations.
The box-and-whisker graph in Fig. 4 shows the time to get
the ultimate mapping result for JAM and our system for three
different probabilities and for three different densities of the
network. In the bar graph in Fig. 5, we compare the overhead
of the two schemes according to the number of messages.
B. Performance of the system
In the second set of experiments, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our system. We took a measure of performance by
incrementing the probability of a node to become reporter,
varying Prep from 0.2 to 0.6. We present performance in terms
of precision and recall. These two values are computed by the
of number of true positive, false positive and false negative
nodes the BS can identify while performing the mapping of
the jammed nodes.
Here, precision (Eq. 3) gives the probability of finding real
jammed nodes classified as jammed by the BS to all then
nodes classified as jammed by the BS. On the other hand recall
(Eq. 4) specifies the probability of original jammed nodes
mapped by the BS among all the jammed nodes present in
the network. Here, TP, FP and FN stands for true positive,
false positive and false negative values for the jammed nodes
identified by the BS, respectively.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4)
TABLE I: Precision and recall
Probability Precision Recall
600 nodes
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.77
0.81
0.82
0.51
0.73
0.75
800 nodes
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.79
0.83
0.84
0.56
0.73
0.80
1000 nodes
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.83
0.84
0.87
0.59
0.75
0.82
TABLE II: Basic setup of the network
Size of Network 49
Average number of neighbors 5.22
Total number of jammed nodes 10
Sensor node signal range 9′′
Jammer signal range 9′′
Average number of jammed regions 1
We did the experiment with three different densities of net-
work of – 600, 800 and 1000 nodes. Results from the second
set of experiments are shown in Table I. Recall improves better
with increasing probability as when the number of reporter
nodes are higher. This is because the BS has more information
about the jammed nodes, which helps the BS to include more
jammed nodes in each region. The improvement in precision
occurs in slower rate as even with the more information on
the jammed nodes the BS can include some unjammed nodes
in the clusters that are unknown to it.
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section we describe a set of experiments that we
conduct using real sensor motes to test the performance of
the jammed region mapping technique. We use Crossbow’s
TelosB motes (TPR2400), which are generally platform for
low-power research development for wireless sensor network
experiments and TinyOS 2.0 for programming.
A. Setup
For our experiments we use a total of 50 motes, of which 49
are used for the network, and one is programmed as jamming
device. We place the motes in a 7×7 grid. We placed adjacent
motes 8′′ apart. Table II summarises the network settings.
The network area is a square of size 48′′ × 48′′. Since the
default radio range of the sensor motes is quite high, We set the
parameter DCC2420-DEF-RFPOWER of the motes to 1, 2 and
3 and found 9′′, 20′′ and 213′′ as corresponding ranges. For
our indoor experiments, we used the lowest range (DCC2420-
DEF-RFPOWER = 1).
1) Jammer node: To make a regular sensor node to work
as the jammer, we bypass the MAC protocol for that mote by
disabling channel sensing and radio back off operation. This
allows the jammer mote to send continuous signals and jam
reception of all the motes those are within its transmission
range.
7TABLE III: Results from simulation of the network
Pr. of selection Precision Recall
0.4 0.50 0.25
0.6 0.81 0.54
0.8 0.94 0.78
2) Neighbor setup: Each sensor node in the network sends
a beacon packet to its neighbors at regular time intervals
(0.4s). We determine the neighbors of a node by setting a
threshold for the number of messages it receives from another
node at unit time.
3) Detection: The beacon packets sent by the motes to its
neighbors are used to detect jamming in the network. When
the jammer node is on, the jammed sensors fail to receive the
regular beacon packets from its neighbors and will be able
to detect that its being jammed. The boundary nodes of the
jammed region notify their un-jammed neighbors that they are
jammed and the un-jammed nodes starts the mapping protocol.
B. Simulation
We give this network setup with each node and its corre-
sponding neighbors and also the list of jammed nodes from
the experiment as input to our simulator (section V) and see
how our region mapping protocol performs for actual jammed
regions. Since the jammed regions that are generated are of
irregular sizes, we used a convex-hull finding algorithm for
the final mapping, instead of the circular shapes. For each
experiment, we run our simulation of region mapping for
1000 times to measure the performance, by selecting random
reporter nodes for each round.
The performance in terms of precision and recall is pre-
sented in Table. III.
VII. CONCLUSION
Jamming is a critical attack against WSNs, which can lead
to a DoS condition. This can prevent the network from mon-
itoring for intruders. Also jamming can be used against other
application scenarios. Also, an attacker can jam random parts
in a network and create a path for himself to go back and forth
through the network, thus creating a critical security breach.
It is important to map out the jammed regions so that this
information can be used in the network for routing and power
management and also for taking reactive measures to deal
with unmonitored regions. Thus, jammed region mapping in
the network helps dealing with jamming and to take effective
measures against it.
In this paper, we proposed an efficient mapping protocol
to map the jammed regions in a network by having the
base station compute and approximate mapping. This relieves
the sensor nodes from sending many mapping messages and
running out of the battery power. The mapping results can
be improved by having more nodes send jamming notification
messages to base station, which creates a trade off between
performance of mapping versus the network overhead. Our
simulation results demonstrate that this system requires less
interactions among the sensor nodes compared with previous
work and thus has less overhead and faster mapping.
We developed our intruder model assuming jamming de-
vices placed randomly in the network and creating circular
interference patterns. In future work, we will study mapping
of jamming regions introduced by jamming devices of more
asymmetric and irregular signal range. We will investigate the
application of improved k-means algorithm [9], [3], so that we
can have better selection of the initial centroids and improved
clustering results in the presence of clusters of irregular size,
density, and shape.
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